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JURISPRUDENCE

A. Legacy Litigation: Claims for "Additional Remediation"
In State v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., the State of Louisi
ana and the Vermilion Parish School Board sued several defendants,
seeking remediation and a money judgment for contamination alleg
edly caused by the defendants' oil and gas activities.1 Such "legacy
litigation" is governed in part by Louisiana Revised Statute 30:29,
which provides that, if a defendant is found liable for contamination,
the Department of Natural Resources must propose a remediation
plan, and the court must approve either that plan or some other plan
that a party proves is more feasible.Any damages awarded to fund
the plan are paid into the registry of the court.2
The defendants sought a summary judgment because the plaintiffs
were not entitled to a money judgment exceeding what was necessary
to fund the approved plan.3 The defendants noted that 30:29(D) re
quires the entirety of the damages award to be placed into the registry
of the court, except as provided by 30:29(H).4 In turn, Subsection (H)
states in part:
This Section shall not preclude an owner of land from pursuing a

judicial remedy or receiving a judicial award for private claims suf

fered as a result of environmental damage, except as otherwise pro
vided in this Section. Nor shall it preclude a judgment ordering
damages for or implementation of additional remediation in excess
of the requirements of the plan adopted by the court pursuant to

this Section as may be required in accordance with the terms of an
express contractual provision. Any award granted in connection with
the judgment for additional remediation is not required to be paid
into the registry of the court.5

The defendants argued that Subsection (H) barred a money judgment
for "remediation in excess of ... the plan" because no contract ex
pressly authorized additional cleanup in this case.6 A majority of the
1. State
1038.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

v.

La. Land and Exploration Co. ' 2012-0884 (La . 1/30/13)· 110 So. 3d

Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1040-41.
Id. at 1064.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30.29(H) (2013) (emphasis added)
.
Louisiana Land, 110 So. 3d at 1053.

'
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Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed, stating that Louisiana Revised
Statute 30:29 is procedural, not substantive.7
The Court's logic seemed to be that, if the Court interpreted the
stat ute as limiting damages to the amount needed to fund the ap
proved plan, that would change substantive rights, at least in those
cases in which a plaintiff otherwise would have been entitled to a
cleanup in excess of regulatory standards, because such an interpreta
tion of the statute would entirely take away any remedy for a portion
of the plaintiffs' injury. In contrast, to the extent that the statute pro
vides that the portion of a money judgment needed to fund the ap
proved plan must be put into the registry of the court and then used to
fund a cleanup, the statute merely specifies that the particular remedy
awarded for a particular portion of the plaintiffs' injury will be an ac
tual cleanup, rather than a payment of the amount of money that
would be needed to fund such a cleanup.
B.
1.

Lease Royalty Disputes
When is Royalty Due

In Slattery Co. Inc. v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP, the plaintiff, Slat
tery Co. ("Slattery"), owned land in Caddo Parish that was subject to
a mineral lease held by Chesapeake. 8 Chesapeake completed two
wells on the leased premises in early 2011.9 Chesapeake began sales
from one of the wells in January 2011 and began sales from the other
well in February 2011.10 Slattery and Chesapeake exchanged emails
regarding when Chesapeake intended to start paying royalties on pro
duction from the two wells, but as of April 2011, Chesapeake had not
paid such royalties.11
On April 13, 2011, Slattery made a written demand on Chesapeake
for the payment of royalties from the two wells.12 Within thirty days of
receiving the letter, Chesapeake responded to Slattery in writing, stat
ing in part: "We are setting up your royalty interest in our system
.... " Chesapeake began paying royalties on production from the first
well on June 29, 2011, and began paying royalties on production from
the second well on September 29, 2011.13
Slattery brought suit, and subsequently sought a summary judgment
that it was entitled to relief that included double damages, attorney's
fees, and interest.14 Although Chesapeake did not make royalty pay7. Id.
8. Slattery Co.
La. Mar. 19, 2013).
9. Id. at *l.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at *2.
14. Id. at *1.

v.

Chesapeake La. LP, No. ll-CV-1399, 2013 WL 1152718 (W.D.
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ments within thirty days of receiving Slattery's written demand, the
court denied Slattery's motion for summary judgment.15 The court
noted that " [a] necessary precondition for the award of damages is a
finding that the mineral royalties were actually 'due."'16 Louisiana
Mineral Code Article 123 provides that a mineral lessee must make
timely payments "according to the terms of the contract or the custom
of the mining industry in question."17 Because the lease at issue did
not specify when payment of royalties was due, such payments were
due in accordance with industry custom.18 The court concluded that
there was an issue of disputed fact regarding whether, under industry
custom, royalties were due at the time Slattery made its written
demand.19
Finally, Slattery argued that Chesapeake's reliance on industry cus
tom was an affirmative defense that was waived because it was not
properly pleaded.20 The court rejected that argument, concluding that
it was part of plaintiff's burden to prove that royalties were already
due when the plaintiff made written demand for payment.21 Accord
ingly, the court denied Slattery's motion for summary judgment.22

2.

Whether Pre-Suit Notice of Royalty Claim Can be Given on
Behalf of Putative Class

In Williams v. Chesapeake Louisiana, Inc., the plaintiffs brought a
putative class action, asserting claims based on the alleged underpay
ment of royalties.23 Chesapeake filed a motion seeking a denial of cer
tification on grounds that Mineral Code Article 137 requires a lessor
to give the lessee thirty-days' notice before bringing a claim for non
payment of royalties.24 Here, the plaintiffs who brought the putative
class action had purported to give the Article 137 notice on behalf of a
class of lessors.25 Chesapeake asserted that each lessor must give the
notice, and that a person cannot give notice on behalf of a proposed
class of lessors who have not themselves given notice.26
Following prior precedent, the court held that, under Louisiana law,
each individual lessor had to give notice, and that notice cannot be
given on behalf of a proposed class.27 The court also rejected the
15. Id. at *1.
16. Id. at *4.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at *4 n.3.
21. Id.
22. Id. at *1.
23. Williams v. Chesapeake La., Inc., No. 10-1906, 2013 WL 951251 (W.D. La.
Mar. 11).
24. Id. at *1.
25. Id. at *2.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *4.
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plaintiffs' argument that, because the plaintiffs sought only monetary
damages and not lease dissolution, the notice requirement did not
apply.2s
The court also examined whether U.S. Supreme Court jurispru
dence makes Article 137's notice requirement inapplicable in federal
actions.29 The district court noted that, in Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., the United States Supreme
Court held that a New York statute that barred class certifications in
cases in which plaintiffs pursue certain types of claims did not pre
clude a federal court sitting in diversity from certifying such a class
action when plaintiffs assert such claims.30 The Supreme Court rea
soned that the New York rule was procedural and that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, which does not bar class actions in such situations,
controlled.31
The district court concluded that Shady Grove did not control the
question of whether a royalty class action could proceed in a Louisi
ana federal court without each member of the proposed class having
satisfied the notice requirement specified in Article 137.32 The district
court reasoned that Mineral Code Article 137 and the articles that
accompany it contain substantive and procedural provisions that are
so intertwined they cannot be separated.33 Therefore, class certifica
tion was not proper on the royalty claims.34
Finally, the court considered the plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrich
ment and their motion for certification of a class to pursue those
claims.35 The court granted Chesapeake's motion to deny certification
of those claims, as well as Chesapeake's motion to dismiss those
claims on summary judgment.36 Under Louisiana law, a claim for un
just enrichment is unavailable if the law provides any other remedy.37
Because Louisiana allows a claim for underpayment of royalties, the
plaintiffs failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment.38

3.

Whether Royalties are Owed on Hedging Profits

In Cimarex Energ y Co. v. Chastant, Cimarex was a mineral lessee,
and Chastant was the lessor.39 The mineral lease required royalties to
28. Id. at *2.
29. Id. at *4.
30. Id. at *3.
31. Id. at *4.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *5.
34. Id.
35. Id. at *6.
36. Id. at *8. •JO.
37. Id. at •8.
38. Id. at •9.
39. Cimarex Energy Co. v. Chastant, Nos. 6:11-CV-1713, 6:11-CV-2146, 2012 WL
665 2360 (W.D. La. Dec. 18, 2012), affd, 2013 WL 3964121 (5th Cir. 2013).
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be paid on oil based on the market price "f.o.b" and for royalties to be
paid on gas based on the market value at the mouth of the well.40
Cimarex had earned some profits through "hedging,"41-a type of
transaction in which a company protects itself against the risk that a
commodity will drop in price by purchasing futures contracts for that
commodity.42 Chastant argued that Cimarex owed royalties on those
profits. Chastant noted that Cimarex had included hedging profits in
the commodity prices it reported in certain filings with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.43 Chastant also cited Frey v. Amoco Pro
duction, in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a lessee
owed royalties on a take-or-pay case settlement because the settle
ment was an "economic benefit accruing from the leased land, gener
ated solely by virtue of the lease."44 Chastant's arguments were
rejected by the court, which held that Cimarex did not owe royalties
on its hedging profits.45
4.

Deductibility of Post-Production Costs

In Dickson v. Sklarco, L.L.C., the plaintiffs and their predecessors
in interest granted a series of oil and gas leases to Sklarco, L.L.C.
("Sklarko") for certain land in Caddo Parish in 2005.46 Sklarco
granted a sublease to Petrohawk Properties, LP ("Petrohawk") for
depths below the Hosston formation.47 Petrohawk established produc
tion of natural gas and began paying royalties.48 At first, Petrohawk
paid royalties that were calculated based on the sales price of the gas,
without any deduction of post-production costs.49 Later, Petrohawk
began taking a deduction for gathering and transportation costs. 50 The
plaintiffs brought suit, arguing that Petrohawk was not entitled to de
duct such costs.51
Both the plaintiffs and Petrohawk moved for summary judgment,
each asserting that the lease was unambiguous.52 The court began its
analysis of the leases by noting that the parties used "Bath" form
leases.53 The printed portion of the leases provided that the royalties
to be paid by the lessee to the lessor would be "on gas ...sold . . . off
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *l.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166 ( La. 1992).
45. Cimarex Energy Co., 2012WL 6652360, at *4.
46. Dickinson v. Sklarco, L.L.C., No. 5:11-CV-00352, 2013WL 1828051 (W.D. La.
Apr. 29, 2013).
47. Id. at *l.
48. Id. at *2.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at *1-2.
53. Id. at *5.
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the premises ... the market value at the well of one-fifth (1/5) of the
gas so sold ... , provided that on gas sold at the wells the royalty shall
be one-fifth (115) of the amount realized from such sale ... "54 The
court noted that the proper interpretation of such a clause is well
established under Louisiana jurisprudence for circumstances in which
a Jessee sells gas away from the well and incurs costs in moving the gas
from the well to the place of sale.55 In such circumstances, the royalty
should be calculated based on the "gross proceeds of the sale," minus
"costs of taking the gas from the wellhead to ... the point of sale." 5 6
The court noted that, if the printed provision had been the only provi
sion relevant to the deductibility of costs, the court's analysis "would
end here." 57
.

But the parties attached to each lease an "Exhibit B" that contained
additional clauses, one of which was a paragraph that discussed de
ductibility of costs.5 8 The paragraph stated:
The parties agree that post production costs may be deducted from
... the proceeds from the sale of ... natural gas ... insofar and only
insofar as such costs either enhance the value of the product being
sold and the price obtained for such product or are required to
make the product marketable. Without limitation upon the forego
ing, the treating, processing, or dehydrating of natural gas to meet
pipeline quality specifications shall be deemed to enhance the value
9
of the product being sold.5

The plaintiffs argued that this clause precluded the deduction of
gathering and transport costs.6 0 They asserted that, under the doctrine
of ejusdem generis, the effect of listing "treating, processing, or dehy
drating" as specific examples of deductible costs was to limit deducti
ble costs to costs of "the same class," and that gathering and
transporting costs were not in the same class.61 The court rejected that
argument, noting that the lease clause stated that the listed examples
were "without limitation upon" the clause's general description of the
types of costs that would be deductible.62 The court concluded that
this prevented application of the ejusdem generis doctrine.6 3
Petrohawk argued that the clause, which they called "Paragraph 8,"
unambiguously allowed the deduction of gathering and transport costs
because the gathering and transport of the gas enhance its value.64
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.

61.
62.
63.

64.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at *6.
at *2.

at *6-7.
at •7.
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The court seemed to agree, stating, "The Court agrees that under its
interpretation of Paragraph 8 alone, gathering and transportation
costs could be deducted from royalty payments as long as those costs
were shown to enhance the value of the product being sold and the
price obtained."65 Thus, under the court's reasoning, Petrohawk
should prevail under the royalty clause of the printed lease, if it was
read alone, or paragraph 8 of Exhibit B, if it was read alone.
But the court saw what it believed was a problem with Petrohawk's
argument. If Paragraph 8 of Exhibit B was given its natural reading, it
would have virtually the same meaning as the royalty clause in the
printed portion of the lease.66 The court had concluded, however, that
each paragraph in Exhibit B was intended to alter some clause in the
printed form.67 Therefore, reasoned the court, Exhibit B created "am
biguity" regarding the parties' intent.68 Accordingly, the court denied
both parties' motions for summary judgment.69
C.

Lease Maintenance Disputes: Judicial Ascertainment Clause

In B.A. Kelly Land Co. L.L.C. v. Questar Exploration and Produc
tion Co., a mineral lessor filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment
that the mineral lease covering its property had expired subsequent to
the primary term, because the lessees did not produce minerals or
conduct operations for a period of several consecutive months.70
The lessees contested the lessor's claim, arguing that the lease had
not terminated for two independent reasons. First, the lease's haben
dum clause provided that the lease would remain in effect for the pri
mary term "and as long thereafter" as minerals were produced or the
65. Id.
66. Id. at *8.
67. Id. at *7.
68. Id. at *9. The court's reasoning can be questioned. Although the court referred
to the existence of an "ambiguity," the court actually seems to have concluded that
the two royalty clauses-one in the printed form and one in the typewritten form
were each unambiguous and that each allowed for the deduction of post-production
costs, provided that those costs increased the value of the gas. What the court appar
ently meant when it referred to "ambiguity" was that that court had concluded that
the parties' actual intent must have been different than what was stated in the type
written form because the court was convinced that the parties must have intended for
every I?r�vision in the typewritten form to modify some provision in the printed form.
But th1� ignores the possibility that the parties intended for the royalty clause in the
typewritten form to clarify the printed form, rather than modify it. Under Louisiana
law, the court should apply the language of the contract as written, and should not
resort to the consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract in the ab
senc� o� ambiguity or absurd result. LA. Civ. CooE art. 2046. It does not appear that
amb1gwty was present or that an absurd result would occur if the lease was inter
preted as written.

69. Dickinson, 2013 WL 1828051, at *9.
70. B.A. Kelly Land Co. v. Questar Exploration & Prod. Co., 47,509 (La. App. 2
.
Cir. 11/14/12); 106 So. 3d 181, 184-85.
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lease was "maintained in any other manner provided."71 The lessees
asserted that the lease's force majeure and shut-in clauses each pro
vided ··other manners" for maintaining the lease and that the lease
had been maintained pursuant to one or the other of those clauses.72

Second, even if one of those clauses did not maintain the lease, the
"judicial ascertainment" clause prevented termination because that
clause establishes certain conditions for lease termination that had not
been satisfied.73 The clause states that, once the lessee had produced
minerals,
this lease shall not be subject to forfeiture or loss, either in whole or
part. for failure to conduct operations in compliance with this con

tract exce pt after judicial ascertainment that Lessee has failed to
conduct such operations and has been given a reasonable opportu
nity after such judicial ascertainment to prevent such loss or forfei

ture by complying with and discharging its obligations as to which
Lessee has been judicially determined to be default.74

The lessees argued that this "judicial ascertainment clause" prevented
lease termination because the lessor had never obtained the required
"judicial ascertainment" or given the lessees a chance to cure any
default.7:"
The lessor replied that the shut-in clause did not apply under the
circumstances that had existed during the period of non-production.76
Further, the lack of production was a resolutory condition that caused
automatic termination of the lease. Thus, the judicial ascertainment
clause did not apply.77 Moreover, the lessees were not entitled to an
opportunity to cure because once the lease has terminated for non
production, subsequent production cannot retroactively revive the
lease.78 The district court dismissed the lessor's claims and denied the
lessor's request to amend its petition to request a judicial ascertain
ment.79 The lessor appealed.80
The Louisiana Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the
judicial ascertainment clause would prevent automatic termination,
provided that there was a bona fide dispute regarding termination,
and that there was a bona fide dispute regarding whether the shut-in
clause had prevented termination of the lease.81 Accordingly, the les71. S<'<' id. at 184 nn. l, 2 (citing habendum clause).
72. Id. at 192.
73. Id. at 188.
74. Id. at 184-85.
75. Id. at 186.
76. Id.
77. It/. at 189.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 186.
80. Id. at 184.
. 81. Id. at 192. Though the plaintiffs' argument was rejected by the appellate court.
It should he noted that there is some authority to support the plaintiffs' position. LA.

(Vol. 1
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sor's suit seeking a declaration that the lease had terminated was pre
mature.82 But rather than affirming the dismissal, the appellate court
remanded, holding that the district court had erred when it denied the
lessor's request for leave to amend its petition to seek a judicial ascer
tainment regarding whether the shut-in clause applied.83
D.

JOA Dispute-Applicability of JOA to Future Leases

In Clovelly Oil Co. v. Midstates Petroleum Co., Clovelly Oil and
Midstates Petroleum each became parties to a 1972 joint operating
agreement ("JOA") through assignments of interest.84 The JOA was
based on the 1956 version of the "AAPL Form 610
Model Form
Operating Agreement."85 The JOA provided that Clovelly owned a
56.25% interest in the mineral rights governed by the JOA and that
Midstates owned the remainder. 86
-

A dispute arose after Midstates acquired a new mineral lease in
2008 that covered an area near the original leases that were governed
by the JOA.87 Clovelly argued that it was entitled to a 56.25% interest
in the new lease.88 Clovelly noted that the text of the JOA stated that
"the lands, oil and gas leasehold interests and oil and gas interests
intended to be developed and operated under this agreement" were
"described in 'Exhibit A.' "89 Exhibit A, which was titled " Lands sub
ject to this agreement," described a geographical area that included
the land covered by Midstates' new lease.90 Effectively, Clovelly ar
gued that this language operated like an area of mutual interest
clause.91
Midstates disagreed. Midstates noted that the JOA used present
tense language when it described the mineral interests to which the
JOA would apply.92 For example, the JOA's preamble states:

[T] he parties . . . are owners of oil and gas leases covering and, if so
indicated, unleased mineral interests in the tracts of land described
in Exhibit "A,'' and all parties have reached an agreement to ex
plore and develop these leases and interests for oil and gas . . . .93
REv. STAT. 31:133 & cmt. (2013); see also PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M.
KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW § 682.2 (2010).
82. B.A. Kelly Land Co., 106 So. 3d at 193.
83. Id.
84. Clovelly Oil Co. , v. Midstates Petroleum Co., 2012-2055 (La. 3/19/13); 112 So.
3d 187, 189.
85. Id. at 190.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 191.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 190-91.
91. Id. at 191.
92. Id. at 192-93.
93. Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
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Similarly, the JOA defined "oil and gas interests" by referring to in
terests that "are owned by the parties."94
The district court granted summary judgment for Midstates, but the
Louisiana Third Circuit reversed, stating that Exhibit A conflicted
with the printed portions of the JOA that referred to interests in the
present tense.95 The appellate court held that, under traditional rules
of contract interpretation, the language of Exhibit A would prevail
because it was typewritten and thus was more likely to reflect the true
intent of the parties than the other, pre-printed portions of the JOA.96
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit's decision
and reinstated judgment for Midstates.97 The Court agreed that type
written language generally will prevail over printed language when a
conflict between them is irreconcilable, but a court should attempt to
reconcile different portions of a contract, even if one of the portions is
printed and the other is typed.98 Here, the purported conflict between
different portions of the JOA could be reconciled if the JOA was in
terpreted as applying only to mineral leases and other mineral inter
ests owned by the parties when the JOA was entered, with Exhibit A
describing a geographical area within which all those interests were
located.99
The Court explained that such an interpretation was reasonable be
cause the parties had not entered a separate area of mutual interest
agreement ("AMI"), which parties commonly do when they want a
JOA to apply to future leases.100 The court also cited commentators
who have noted that JOAs typically do not apply to future leases in
the absence of an AMI.101 Indeed, the American Association of Pro
fessional Landmen, the promulgator of the model form used by the
parties, had filed an amicus brief supporting Midstates's position.102
E.
1.

Unit Disputes

Formation of Voluntary Units

In Midnight Drilling, LLC v. Triche, Midnight Drilling drilled and
completed a well, which began producing oil and gas in 2009.103 The
Louisiana Office of Conservation entered an order creating a compul
sory unit, designating Midnight's well as the unit well and naming
94. Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 191.
96. Id. at 193.
97. Id. at 196.
98. Id. at 193-94.
99. Id. at 194.
100. Id. at 195.
101. Id. at 195-96.
102. Id. at 196 n.35.
103. Midnight Drilling. LLC v. Triche, No. 2012 CA 1043, 2013 WL 3149456
C t. App. June 19, 2013).

(La.
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Midnight as the operator.104 The unit covered an area where Midnight
had executed multiple mineral leases as lessee.105 Because numerous
lessors disputed who had a right to receive lease royalty payments,
Midnight filed a concursus action.106
The rival claimants for the disputed mineral royalties were the
"Triches" and the "Cole group. "107 The Triches owned two tracts of
land, one located to the north of the Intercoastal Waterway, and the
other located to the south of the Waterway, but they did not own the
land under the Intercoastal Waterway itself.108 The Cole group inher
ited a mineral servitude that covered the north tract and a separate
mineral servitude that covered the south tract.109 The servitudes were
created when the Cole group's predecessor-in-interest had sold the
two tracts but reserved mineral rights for each.11°
The royalties in dispute were royalties attributable to the north
tract, which was within the compulsory unit. The Triches argued that
they were entitled to the disputed royalties because the mineral servi
tude covering that tract had terminated by prescription of nonuse
before 2009.111 The Cole group disagreed, asserting that prescription
of nonuse had been interrupted by the drilling of an earlier well, the
Cole #2 Well, and that the servitude therefore had not terminated.112
The Cole group advanced two arguments in support of their conten
tion that the drilling of the earlier well (the Cole #2 Well) interrupted
prescription. First, it argued that the parties had created a voluntary
unit for the Cole #2 Well and that the unit area included the northern
104. Id. at *1.
105. Id.
106. Id. A concursus is similar to an interpleader action. Cimarex Energy Co. v.
Mauboules, 2009-1170 (La. 4/9/10); 40 So. 3d 931, 938-39; compare LA. CoDE Civ.
PRoc. ANN. arts. 4651-62 (1998), with FED. R. Crv. P. 22, and 28 U.S.C. § 1335
(2012).
107. Midnight Drilling, Inc., 2013 WL 3149456, at *1. Louisiana law does not recog
nize mineral estates. Hodges v. Long Bell Petroleum Co., 121 So. 2d 831, 836 (La.
1959). But it recognizes mineral servitudes. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:21 (2000). A
mineral servitude is similar to a mineral estate, except that a mineral servitude termi
nates by prescription of nonuse if it is not used for any ten-year period. § 31:27. For
purposes of interrupting prescription of nonuse, a "use" is either the production of
minerals to which the servitude applies or good faith drilling in an attempt to produce
such minerals. §§ 31:29, 31:36.
108. Midnight Drilling, Inc., 2013 WL 3149456, at *1.
109. Under Louisiana law, a person cannot create a servitude that covers noncon
.
tiguous tracts. § 31:64. Because the north and south tracts were separated by land
owned by someone other than the Triches, the servitude rights inherited by the Cole
group constituted two separate servitudes-one covering the north tract and the other
.
covermg the south tract. See Midnight Drilling, Inc., 2013 WL 3149456 at *l.
110. Id.
111. I� a couple of places in the opinion, the First Circuit referred to "liberative
.
prescnpt10n, : ' but that reference is erroneous. See id. at *2. Although prescription of
n?nyse prev10usly was classified as a form of liberative prescription, the Louisiana
.
C:IVll Code now recogmzes
that liberative prescription and prescription of nonuse are
different types of prescription. LA. C1v. CODE ANN. art. 3445 cmt. (b) (2007).
112. Midnight Drilling, Inc., 2013 WL 3149456, at *2.
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tract.113 The Cole group did not allege that the parties had agreed in
writing to create a unit. Instead, the Cole group claimed that the par
ties "acted in such a manner that the Cole #2 well was produced on a
unit basis" and that they had created a voluntary unit through their
conduct.114
The Louisiana First Circuit rejected that argument. The court noted
that mineral servitudes are classified as "incorporeal immovables"
under Louisiana law, and agreements transferring rights relating to
immovables generally must be in writing.115 The court then concluded
that the parol evidence rule barred the Cole group's argument that the
parties created a voluntary unit through their conduct.116
The Cole group's second argument was based on the fact that, al
though the Cole #2 well was not bottomed beneath the northern tract,
the well was a directional well that had been drilled from a surface
location on the northern tract.117 The Cole group argued that the drill
ing on the northern tract interrupted prescription.118 The First Circuit
also rejected that argument.119 The court held that the bottom hole
location from which oil and gas would be produced, not the surface
well site, was the critical location for determining whether the drilling
of the well interrupted prescription.120 Because the bottom hole loca
tion was not beneath the northern tract, and because the well was not
a unit well for a unit that included the servitude tract at issue, the
drilling of the well did not interrupt prescription of nonuse.121
2.

Alternate Unit Wells

In Walker v. 1-W Operating Co., the Commissioner of Conservation
established units in Caspiana Field following the discovery of natural
gas there in the 1970s.122The Commissioner's orders included findings
of fact that each unit could be efficiently drained by one well.123 Be
ginning in the 1990s, various companies requested approval for "alter
nate unit wells" to be drilled as additional wells within existing units
that already had a unit well.124 The companies asserted that newer
geologic evidence showed that the existing unit wells were not eco113. Id. at *3.
114. A unit can he created by order of the Com missioner of Conservation or by
�greement of the l?arties . LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:213(6) (2013). Unit activity can
.
mkrrupt prescription of nonuse. §§ 31:33-36.
1 1 5. Midnight Drilling, Inc., 2013 WL 3149456, at *3.
1 1 6. Id. at *3-4.
1 1 7. Id. at *4.

118. Id.
1 1 9. Id. at *4-5.
120. Id. at *5.
121. Id. at *6.
122. Walker v. J-W Operating Co., No. 2012 CA 0662, 2012 WL 6677913, at *8 (La.
Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2012).
123. Id. at *1.
124. Id. at *2.

116

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1

nomically and efficiently draining their units.12 5 After public hearings,
the Commissioner approved numerous alternate unit wells, several of
which were drilled on land that was owned by the plaintiffs, but bur
dened by a mineral servitude.12 6
The plaintiffs filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the
Commissioner lacked authority to approve alternate unit wells be
cause Louisiana Revised Statute 30:9 defines a unit to be "the maxi
mum area which may be efficiently and economically drained by one
well."12 7 The court noted, however, that the issue was not the initial
establishment of a unit well, but what the Commissioner has authority
to do when evidence shows that an existing unit well is not efficiently
draining the unit.12 8 The plaintiffs argued that the Commissioner's
only option is to reconfigure units, but the Louisiana First Circuit dis
agreed, holding that the Commissioner has discretion to approve al
ternate unit wells in order to prevent the waste of resources.12 9
F.

Unit Operator's Duty to Send Reports to Unleased
Mineral Interest Owners

In certain circumstances, Louisiana law requires the operator of a
unit well to give the owners of unleased mineral interests "a sworn,
detailed, itemized statement" containing "the costs of drilling, com
pleting, and equipping the unit well."13 0 If an operator fails to comply
with this requirement and then does not send the required reports
within thirty days after receiving written notice of such failure, the
operator can forfeit its right to demand that the owner of the unleased
interest contribute its share of the costs of drilling and completing the
well.131Two recent cases have applied these statutes in circumstances
that required the court to interpret the statutes.
1.

In What Circumstances Does the Duty to Send Reports Apply

In Adams v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., the court interprets two
statutes: one that governs the duty of a unit operator to send certain
reports to unleased owners and a second that establishes a penalty
that can apply if the operator breaches its reporting duty.13 2
The primary difficulty in the interpretation of the statutes is deter
mining what circumstances will trigger the duty to report. Louisiana
Revised Statute 30:103.l(A) states that the operator of a unit well for
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
(W.D.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at *l.

at *4.
at *5.
at *6.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:103.1 (2013).
§ 30:103.2.
Adams v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., No. 11-CV-1504, 2013 WL 1193716
La. Mar. 21, 2013).
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a compulsory unit ''shall issue" detailed reports of drilling costs to the
owners of unleased mineral interests within ninety days of completion
of the well.133 If read in isolation, that provision suggests that the op
erator of a compulsory unit always has a duty to send reports to the
owners of unleased mineral interests. On the other hand, a separate
paragraph in the same statute, Louisiana Revised Statute 30:103.l(C),
states that the operator must send such reports "by certified mail to
each owner of an unleased oil or gas interest who has requested such
reports in writing, by certified mail addressed to the operator."134 If
read in isolation, this second provision clearly suggests that the duty to
report does not apply unless the owner of an unleased mineral sends
written requests via certified mail.
One way to reconcile the two provisions is to interpret Revised
Statute 30:103.l(C) as governing whether a duty to report applies, and
to interpret 30:103.l(A), which contains much more detail regarding
what must be reported, as governing what must be reported and how
quickly it must be reported. Another way to reconcile the two provi
sions would be that 30:103.l(A) establishes a reporting duty that al
ways applies and that 30:103.l(C) establishes a process by which an
unleased mineral interest owner can demand that the reports he re
quests be sent by certified mail.
The second statute, Louisiana Revised Statute 30:103.2, establishes
the penalty than can apply. The statute states:

133.

In its entirety, the provision states:

A. Whenever there is included within a drilling unit, as authorized by the
commissioner of conservation, lands producing oil or gas, or both, upon
which the operator or producer has no valid oil, gas, or mineral lease, said
operator or producer shall issue the following reports to the owners of said
interests by a sworn, detailed, itemized statement:
( 1) Within ninety calendar days from completion of the well, an initial report
which shall contain the costs of drilling, completing, and equipping the unit
well.
(2) After establishment of production from the unit well, quarterly reports
which shall contain the following:
(a) The total amount of oil, gas, or other hydrocarbons produced from the
lands during the previous quarter.
(b) The price received from any purchaser of unit production.
(c) Quarterly operating costs and expenses.
(d) Any additional funds expended to enhance or restore the production of
the unit well.

§ 30: 103.l{A).

134.

Louisiana Revised Statute 30:103.l(C) states:
Reports shall he sent by certified mail to each owner of an unleased oil or
gas interest who has requested such reports in writing, by certified mail ad
dressed to the operator or producer. The written request shall contain the
unleased interest owner's name and address. Initial reports shall be sent no
later than ninety calendar days after the completion of the well. The opera
tor or producer s all begin �ending quarterly reports within ninety calendar
.
days after rece1vmg
the written request, whichever is later, and shall con
tinue s endin g quarterly reports until cessation of production.

�

§ 30:103.l(C).
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Whenever the operator permits ninety calendar days to elapse from
completion of the well and thirty additional calendar days to elapse
from date of receipt of written notice by certified mail from the
owner or owners of unleased oil and gas interests calling attention
to failure to comply with the provision of R.S. 30:103.1, such opera
tor or producer shall forfeit his right to demand contribution from
the owner or owners of the unleased oil and gas interests for the
costs of the drilling operations of the well.135

In Adams, the plaintiff, his siblings, and his son were owners of an
unleased mineral interest in a compulsory unit for which Chesapeake
drilled a unit well in October 2010.136 In February 201 1, the plaintiff,
his siblings, and his son each sent a certified letter to Chesapeake,
stating that the company had "failed to comply with the provisions of
Louisiana RS 30:103.1."137 The letters also requested copies of the re
ports required by Louisiana Revised Statute 30:103.1.138 Within a
short time, Chesapeake sent copies of the required reports to the
plaintiff's siblings and son, but did not send a report to the plaintiff.139
The plaintiff did not contact Chesapeake again about the issue until
mid-April, when his attorney sent a letter to Chesapeake.140 The letter
stated that Chesapeake had forfeited its right to demand contribution
from the plaintiff for his share of drilling costs because the company
had not sent a report of costs to the plaintiff.141 Chesapeake sent a
copy of the report to the plaintiff later that month, but the plaintiff
filed suit, seeking a judgment that Chesapeake had forfeited its right
to seek a contribution for drilling costs from him.142
The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisi
ana rejected the plaintiff's claims.143 The court held that the Louisiana
Revised Statute 30:103.l reporting duty does not apply unless and un
til the unleased mineral interest owner has sent a written request by
certified mail.144 Because the plaintiff's February 2011 letter to Chesa
peake was the plaintiff's first letter requesting a report, Chesapeake
did not have a duty to send a report until it received that letter.145
The court also analyzed Louisiana Revised Statute 30:103.2. The
court noted that this statute imposes a penalty on an operator who
fails to send a report within thirty days of receiving written notice of
his "failure to comply" with the reporting requirements of 30:103. 1 .146
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

§ 30:103.2.
Adams, 2013 WL 1193716, at *1.
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *2.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4, *6.
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The court reasoned that the plaintiff's February 201 1 letter to Chesa
peake could not serve as written notice of its "failure to comply" with
the duty to send reports because that duty did not exist until Chesa
peake received the February 201 1 letter.1 47 Thus, the company's first
written notice of its failure to comply with its reporting duties was
when it received the mid-April letter from the plaintiff's lawyer. Be
cause Chesapeake sent the required reports within thirty days of re
ceiving the lawyer's letter, the 30: 1 03.2 penalty did not apply.

2.

What Constitutes a Detailed Report

In Brannon Properties, LLC v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., the par
ties disputed whether a report that the operator sent contained suffi
cient detail to satisfy the operator's statutory duty to send well cost
8
reports to unleased mineral interest owners.41
There, Chesapeake was the operator of a unit well for a compulsory
unit, and Brannon Properties was an unleased mineral interest
owner. 14 9 Chesapeake sent a report to Brannon within the time re
quired, but the parties disputed whether the report was sufficiently
"detailed" to satisfy the statutory requirement that an operator pro
vide a "detailed " statement of costs.1 5° Chesapeake's report, which
was eighteen pages long, listed the date and dollar amount of ex
penses and identified each expense as being either a "Tangible Drill
ing and Completion" cost or an "Intangible Drilling and Completion"
cost.151 The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
the report was not sufficient to satisfy the statutory duty to provide a
report that contains a detailed list of drilling expenses. 152 The court
acknowledged that the statute, which imposes the duty, does not spec
ify what information is required , but the court stated that the list,
which Chesapeake provided to Brannon, could not satisfy any reason
able understanding of the word "detailed." 1 53 The court contrasted
the report to other reports that Chesapeake had provided, including a
report for a different well that contained a description of the type of
equipment, supplies, or service associated with each cost.154 Because
the report at issue did not satisfy statutory requirements, the court
held that Chesapeake had forfeited its right to demand that B rannon
pay its share of d rilling costs for the unit well.155
1 47. Id. at "'4.
1 48. Brannon Props., LLC v . Chesapeake Operating, I nc., No. 1 2 -30306, 2013 WL
657781 ( 5 th Cir. Feb. 2 1 , 20 1 3 ).
149. Id. at "' I .
1 50. Id.
1 5 1 . Id.
1 52. Id. at "'2, *4.

153. Id. at "'2.
1 54. Id. at *3.
1 55. Id. at •4.
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A cquisitive Prescription

In Roberts v. Patterson, the plaintiff owned and held record title to
certain property in Bossier Parish.156 She had acquired the property
from her father, who had owned it since the 1 950s . 1 57 During that en
tire time, a fence had stood along a line that the plaintiff thought was
the north border of the property. 158 But the fence was, in fact, some
what north of the property line, so that the fence enclosed 2.2 acres to
which the plaintiff did not have record title. 159
In 1 999, a company called Investors Property Group ("IPG") pur
chased a tract that included the 2.2 acres.160 IPG later leased the 2.2
acres to lessees for use as pastureland, and those lessees erected a
fence enclosing the 2.2 acres .161 The plaintiff then brought a posses
sory action, claiming to have the right to possess the property. 1 62 IPG
intervened, asserting ownership of the property and thereby con
verting the litigation to a petitory action. 1 63
The trial court heard evidence and entered a judgment that the
plaintiff had acquired ownership of the surface by thirty years acquisi
tive prescription.164 But the court held that the plaintiff had not ac
quired ownership of mineral rights because she had not used the
mineral rights and therefore had not "possessed" them. 1 65 The plain
tiff appealed the portion of the j udgment holding that she had not
acquired mineral rights. The other parties did not appeal.166
The appellate court reversed.1 67 The court noted that Mineral Code
Article 1 60 states: "When title to land is perfected by a possessor on
the basis of acquisitive prescription, the title includes mineral rights to
the extent that his possession included mineral rights for the required
"1 8
prescriptive period. 6
The appellate court appears to have reached the correct conclusion.
Further, Mineral Code Article 1 60, which the appellate court cited,
ultimately controls the result. But that article does not fully explain
the apparent error in the district court's reasoning because Article 160
merely provides that a person who obtains ownership of land by ac
quisitive prescription also acquires ownership of mineral rights "to the
extent that his possession included mineral rights . " But given that

156. Roberts v. Patterson, 47, 576 (La.
157. Id. at 817.
158. Id.
1 59. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.

167.
168.

Id.
Id.

at 818.
at 818-19.
at 818.

App. 2

Cir. 1116/13); 108 So. 3d 816.
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mineral rights may be "possessed" by using them, 169 and that the
plaintiff had not used the mineral rights, someone might conclude that
Article 160 was consistent with the district court's decision, rather
than with the appellate court's decision. Yet such a conclusion would
be erroneous. Mineral Code Article 155, which was not explicitly cited
by the appellate court, provides that a p erson who does not have title,
but who possesses property as if he were the owner, "possesses the
mineral rights inherent in perfecting ownership of land."170 That pos
session can be lost if someone else actually uses the mineral rights,171
but apparently no one else had used the mineral rights during the
thirty-year period in which the plaintiff was acquiring ownership via
acquisitive prescription.
H.

Usufructs

In Quantum Resources Management, L. L. C. v. Pirate Lake Oil
Corp. , Mr. and Mrs. Jones had three children.172 Mrs. Jones died tes
tate, bequeathing to Mr. Jones all of her property, including certain
land that was separate property and subject to a mineral lease. 173 But
the children were forced heirs, and in a succession proceeding, the
legacy to Mr. Jones was reduced to a one-half interest in the property
and a usufruct174 over the remaining one-half interest.175 No oil or gas
well existed on the property prior to Mrs. Jones death, but two wells
were drilled between the time of her death and the time of the court
order reducing Mr. Jones's legacy.176 Mr. Jones and his daughter dis
puted who was entitled to royalties from the wells, so the operators of
the wells filed a concursus. 177
Article 1 90(B) of the Mineral Code governs the extent to which a
usufructuary of land has a right to proceeds from minerals when the
"usufruct is that of a surviving spouse," but Louisiana's Fifth Circuit
concluded that article 190(B) did not apply. 178 The court reasoned
169. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3 1 :153 (2013 ) .
170. § 31:155.
171 . § 31:156.
172. Quantum Res. Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 12-256 (La. App. 5 Cir.
1 1/13/12); 105 So. 3d 867.
173. Id. at 869.
174. A "[u]sufruct is a real right of limited duration on the property of another."
!--A. C1v. CooE ANN. art. ?35 (2013); see also art. 890 (regarding usufruct of a surviv
ing spous� ). If a usufruct 1s for the life of the usufructuary (the person who receives
the benefit of the usufruct), the usufruct is somewhat like a life estate. See Pendegast
v. Scha�tz, 30 La. Ann. 590 (La. 1878) (comparing usufruct to a life estate); but see
Succession of Hunter, 105 So. 596, (La. 1925) (holding that the wording of particular
bequest could n<?t be construed as a usufruct and instead was an attempt to d esignate
a common law hfe estate, which is not recognized under Louisiana law).
175. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 869.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 869-70.
178. Id. at 873.
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that Mr. Jones had inherited the usufruct in the capacity of a legatee,
not as a surviving spouse.179
The court determined that Mr. Jones's usufruct was a conventional
usufruct and that Mineral Code Article 190(A) applied . 1 80 It provides
that "if there is no provision including the use and enjoyment of min
eral rights in a conventional usufruct, the usufructuary is entitled to
the use and enjoyment of the landowner's rights in minerals as to
mines or quarries actually worked at the time the usufruct was cre
ated. " 181 With respect to oil and gas, Mineral Code Article 1 9 1 ex
plains that this means the usufructuary is entitled to "the landowner's
rights in minerals as to all pools penetrated " by any wells that were
producing or capable of producing when the usufruct was created. 1 82
Mr. Jones's daughter argued that Mr. Jones's usufruct was created
at the time of Mrs. Jones's death (before any wells existed) because a
legatee's right to inherited property arises at the time of a testator's
death, but the court disagreed.183 Mrs. Jones's testament had granted
her husband full ownership.184 The succession proceeding court re
duced Mr. Jones's legacy (and substituted a usufruct) because it im
pinged on the children's rights as forced heirs, but forced heirs can
waive their rights, and such rights do not affect a succession until as
serted and recognized by a court. 1 85 Thus, Mr. Jones was entitled to
proceeds from the well that was drilled after his wife died and before
the judgment reducing his legacy.186
I.

Trespass Claim and Civil Code Article 670 Predial Servitude

In SGC Land, LLC v. Louisiana Midstream Gas Services, Chesa
peake had acquired a mineral lease that contained two clauses, which
had the effect of generally prohibiting Chesapeake from using the
leased premises for any purpose other than the support of a well
drilled on the premises. 1 87 After Chesapeake began drilling a well on
the leased premises, the company and the lessors entered a surface
use agreement that authorized Chesapeake to construct a pipeline on
the premises, but which also provided that the pipeline could only
carry gas from wells drilled on the leased premises.188 Chesapeake as
signed its rights to Louisiana Midstream Gas Services, Inc. ("Mid179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 871-72.
182. Id. at 872.
183. Id. at 870.
184. Id. at 873.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 874.
187. SGC Land, LLC
La. 2013).
188. Id.

v.

La. Midstream Gas Servs., 939 F. Supp. 2d 612, 615 (W.D.
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stream"), which entered a third agreement with the lessors.189 This
dstream t e right to con�tr1:1ct and operate a
agreement granted

�

�

pipeline along a specified route without any restnct10ns on the source
of the gas that the pipeline carried. 190

Midst ream constructed a pipeline across the leased premises and
began using it to carry both gas produced from the leased premises
and "third party gas" produced from other property.191 The plaintiffs
discovered, however, that there was a section of pipeline "less than 30
feet" in length that strayed outside the route designated in the Ease
ment and Right of Way by an amount "no more than 4.4 feet."192 The
plaintiffs brought suit for trespass, seeking a disgorgement of all prof
its earned by use of the pipeline. 193
The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisi
ana noted that, under Louisiana law, a disgorgement of profits is not
an available remedy for unauthorized possession of property unless
the possession is in bad faith.194 The court noted that the contracts
authorized Midstream to construct and operate a pipeline "anywhere
on the property , " s o long as it did not carry third party gas, and that
the contracts authorized Midstream to construct and operate a pipe
line that carried third party gas, as long as it followed a specified
route.195 The court concluded that the construction of the pipeline
about four feet outside the route that was designated for a line that
would carry third party gas "did not harm Plaintiffs" and did not ap
pear to bring "any additional profits" to the lessees.196 Further, the
court stated that, "the entire record reveals an inadvertent surveying
mistake, not bad faith." Thus, the remedy of disgorgement of profits
was not available.197
The court found that the most appropriate damages analysis was
derived from the d octrine of encroachment, which is found in Civil
Code Article 670.198 The article provides that, when a landowner in
good faith constructs a building that e ncroaches on the neighboring
property, and the neighbor does not complain until after the construc
tion is substantially complete, the landowner who constructed the
building is entitled to a predial servitude that allows the building to
remain in place, though he must pay fair compensation for that servi189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 620.
Id. Further, the court concluded that the violation committed by the lessees
was " more accurately classified as a breach of contract, not a trespass." Id. at 619.
198. Id. at 620 .
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tude.199 The court held that the defendants were entitled to a servi
tude for a "for a reasonable area surrounding the pipeline," subject to
the obligation to pay the landowners for that servitude.200
The plaintiffs also sought lease dissolution based on the apparently
undisputed fact that Chesapeake had used a frac pond and other facil
ities on the leased premises to support both the well drilled on the
leased premises and a well drilled on other property.201 Chesapeake
argued that the lease prohibited the lessee from using the leased
premises to support operations on other land until the first well was
drilled on the leased premises, but allowed the leased premises to be
used after that time to support o perations on other land.202 The court
rejected Chesapeake's interpretation and concluded that Chesa
peake's use of the facilities to support drilling activities on other
properties was a violation of the lease .203 But the court also noted that
the surface use restrictions in the lease were "inartfully worded "204
and that Chesapeake could have reached its interpretation of the sur
face use restrictions in good faith.205 Under Louisiana law, a party's
right to dissolution of a lease is subject to j udicial control.206 Under
the circumstances of this case, the court held that dissolution was not
appropriate.207
J.

Imprescriptible Mineral Servitudes

In Yates v. Marston ,208 Ruby and Son Hui Yates (the "Yates") pur
chased land in Red River Parish in 1 99 7 that was subj ect to two min
eral servitudes. One of the servitudes, which was for one-half of any
minerals produced from the property, was created in 1 995 and was
owned by Marston.209 Young reserved the second servitude, which
was for one-fourth of any minerals produced from the property, when
he sold the property to the Yates in 1 997 .2 10
In 2002, the Yates sold the land to the Nature Conservancy. The
deed transferring the land stated that the Yates "hereby expressly re
serve unto themselves . . . all of the subsurface oil, gas and liquid hy
drocarbons in, on, or under the property . . . and reversionary rights
related thereto."21 1 The immediate effect of this reservatio n was to
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 622.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Yates v. Morrison, 48,009 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/13); 121 So. 3d 673 .
Id. at 674.
Id.
Id.

2014)

LOUISIA NA

1 25

create a mineral servitude in favor of the Yates for one-fourth of all
minerals . 2 1 2 The reservation could not i mmediately grant any greater
servitud e rights in favor of the Yates because of the outstanding servi
tud es in favor of Marston and Young for three-fourths of the miner
als .2 1 J It is noteworthy for the dispute that later arose, however, that
the Yates purported to reserve all of the mineral and reversionary

rights .214
The Nature Conservancy sold the land to the United States in Au
gust 2003.2 1 5 In March 2008, more than ten years after the creation of
the servitudes held by Marston and Young, the Yates granted a min
eral lease to Petrohawk Properties, LP ( "Petrohawk"), which began
drilling later that year, several Haynesville Shale wells for units that
included the property.216 Petrohawk's drilling apparently was the first
m ineral activity relating to the property i n more than ten years. Pe
trohawk began producing natural gas from those wells and paid all
royalties attributable to the property to the Yates.217
A dispute arose between the Yates, Marston, and Young regarding
entitlement to royalties.218 Marston and Young argued that their servi
tudes still were in effect and that they therefore were entitled to a
share of proceeds from the production of Petrohawk's wells.2 1 9 The
Yates argued that the Marston and Young servitudes had terminated
by prescription of nonuse, making the Yates the owners of all the min
eral rights relating to the property.220 Both sides relied on M ineral
Code provisions relating to imprescriptible mineral servitudes, includ
ing Mineral Code Article 149.l, which was in effect at the time of
Yates' sale to the Nature Conservancy, though the article has been
repealed and replaced since then.221 The former article stated:
When land is acquired from any person by (a] . . . nonprofit land
conservation organization by conventional deed, donation, or other
contract and by the act of acquisition, a mineral right otherwise sub
ject to the prescription of nonuse is reserved, the grescription of
nonuse shall not run against the mineral right . . . . 2

The Second Circuit noted that the statute referred to "mineral
right" twice; the first time referred to "a mineral right," and the sec
ond time referred to "the mineral right. "22� The court acknowledged
2 1 2.
213.
214.
215.
2 1 6.
217.
218.
219.
220.
22 1 .

Id.
Id. at 679.
Id.
Id. at 674.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 675-76.
Id.
222 . Id.
223. Id. at 679.
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that the phrase "the mineral righ t (definite article) appears to relate to
the first, a mineral right (indefinite article)" and indeed that would
seem to comport with the typical use of language.224 Notwithstanding
the statute's apparent meaning, the maj ority concluded that the
phrase "the mineral right" did "not necessarily" apply only to "a min
eral right. "225 Accordingly, the court stated that the statute's provision
that prescription would not run against "the mineral right" was not
necessarily limited to "a mineral right" created in the transfer of land
to a nonprofit land conservation organization.226 Instead, the major
ity's opinion was that the statute was ambiguous.227 The court's expla
nation that the statue was ambiguous is not entirely convincing, but
having reached that conclusion, the court had to decide how to inter
pret the supposedly ambiguous statute.
The court then said that it would interpret the statute in the manner
that "best conforms to the purpose of the law."228 The majority ulti
mately concluded that, under old article 149.1, the pre-existing servi
tudes held by Marston and Young were rendered imprescriptible by
the Yates' sale of land to the Nature Conservancy.229
The court also addressed another issue. After the Yates sold the
land to the Nature Conservancy, but before the Nature Conservancy
re-sold the land to the Federal Government, the legislature repealed
Article 149.1 and replaced it with a new article 149.230 The new article
149 contained provisions with language very similar to the language in
old Article 149.1 that allowed for the creation of imprescriptible servi
tudes. But the new article 149 also contained a new section that al
lowed a landowner to retain a reversionary interest with respect to
outstanding mineral rights.231 That new section explicitly states that
the pre-existing servitude would still be subject to prescription.232 The
Yates argued that the new article should be given retroactive effect
and that the article would both validate their purported reservation of
a reversionary interest and make clear that prescription still ran on the
pre-existing servitudes. The majority concluded, however, that this
provision should not be given retroactive effect.233 Judge Caraway
dissented. 234
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/nterp rt'ltltimz of Overriding Royalty Deed 's "Calculate and Pay "
Clau.ff in Relation to the Deep Water Royalty Relief A ct

K.

In Total t:& P USA . Inc.

v.

Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas, t he parties dis

puted the proper interpretation of an overriding royalty deed and
whether the lessee 's obligation to pay overriding royal t ies was af
fe cted by t h e Deep Water Royalty Relief Act ( " DWRRA") .235

The United States adopted D WR RA in 1 995 to encourage d rilling
in deep wa ters o n t he outer continental shelf.:?30 DWRRA a u t horized
the Department of I n terior to suspend collection of certain royalties
that ot herwise would be owed under federal offshore l e ases for the
prod uction of oil a nd gas in deep water between 1 996 and 2000 . 237 The
suspension would apply until a certain th reshold amount of p rod uc
tion was obt a i nc d . 2.lx
In 1 998. the Federal Govern m e n t issued an offshore lease to Mari
ner Energy and Westport Oil and G as. 2.w Westport assigned overrid
ing royalty i nterests ( "OR Ris") to several persons.240 The assignments
contained a "calcu late and pay" cl ause t hat stated: "The overriding
roya lty interest assigned herein shall be calculated and paid in the
same manner and subject to the same terms and conditions as the
landowner's royal t y under the Lease. "24 1 Westport and Mari n e r later
assigned their i n t e rests to Chevron, Total E & P ( "Tota l " ) , and
Statoi l. 24 2
In 2009, the new owners of the lease established production. 24-� Be
cause the prod uction qualified for a royalty suspensio n , the owners
did not pay roya lties to the Federal Government, but Chevron began
making payme nts to the ORRis owners and continued to do so.244 I n
contrast, Total a n d Statoil took t h e posi tion that, for purposes o f the
"calculate and pay" clause. the royalty suspension was one of the
"terms and conditions" of thei r obligation to make royalty payments
to the "landowner. "24'.'I Accordingly. they argued their obliga ti on to
make O R R l s payments was also suspended. The ORRis owners dis
agreed and litigation ensued.246
The district cou rt granted summary j udgment for Statoil and Tot al.
but the U n ited States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reverse d . con2.15.
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eluding that the "calculate and pay" clause was ambiguous.247 The
Fifth Circuit stated that the clause could be interpreted as incorporat
ing the federal regulations that define how royalties are calculated,
without interpreting the clause as also incorporating DWRRA's sus
pension of royalty payment obligations.248 Because of the ambiguity,
the Fifth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings.249
II.

LEGISLATION: GRANT OF EXPLICIT AUTHORITY AND
DIRECTIVE TO REGULATE SOLUTION MINING

In 2013, Act No. 368 amended Louisiana Revised Statute 30:3 to
add definitions of "solution mined cavern" and "solution mining injec
tion well. " Act No. 368 also amended Louisiana Revised Statute 30:4
to direct that the Office of Conservation must promulgate rules to
regulate solution mining.
247. Id. at 440-41.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 441.

